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1 Introduction
Linguists and philosophers are sometimes at odds in the semantical analysis
of language. This is because linguists tend to assume that language must be
semantically analyzed in terms of mental constructs, whereas philosophers tend
to assume that only a platonic realm of intensional entities will su¢ ce. The
problem for the linguist in this conict is how to explain the apparent realist
posits we seem to be committed to in our use of language, and in particular in
our use of innitives, gerunds and other forms of nominalized predicates. The
problem for the philosopher is the old and familiar one of how we can have knowl-
edge of independently real abstract entities if all knowledge must ultimately be
grounded in psychological states and processes. In the case of numbers, for ex-
ample, this is the problem of how mathematical knowledge is possible. In the
case of the intensional entities assumed in the semantical analysis of language,
it is the problem of how knowledge of even our own native language is possible,
and in particular of how we can think and talk to one another in all the ways
that language makes possible.
I believe that the most natural framework in which this conict is to be
resolved and which is to serve as the semantical basis of natural language is
an intensional logic that is based upon a conceptual analysis of predication in
which what a predicate stands for in its role as a predicate is distinguished from
what its nominalization denotes in its role as a singular term. Predicates in
such a framework stand for concepts as cognitive capacities to characterize and
relate objects in various ways, i.e., for dispositional cognitive structures that do
not themselves have an individual nature, and which therefore cannot be the
objects denoted by predicate nominalizations as abstract singular terms. The
objects purportedly denoted by nominalized predicates, on the other hand, are
intensional entities, e.g., properties and relations (and propositions in the case
of 0-place predicates), that have their own abstract form of individuality, which,
though real, is posited only through the concepts that predicates stand for in
their role as predicates. That is, intensional objects are represented in this logic
as concept-correlates, where the correlation is based on a logical projection of
the content of the concepts whose correlates they are.
I have already described several such intensional logics in [2], [3] and [4],
where the emphasis was on predicable concepts and their concept-correlates. I
will review that account here to some extent, but my primary concern will be
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with the logic of referential concepts and the intensional objects that are their
correlates. These objects, as we shall see, are also based on a logical projection
of the content of the referential concepts whose correlates they are, but in this
case the projection is through a double correlation, rst of referential concepts
with predicable concepts, and then of predicable concepts with their concept-
correlates. As the products of such a projection of the content of referential
concepts, these objects provide both a natural and a general solution of the
problem of analyzing intensional discourse. They also provide a natural source
from which to identify the objects of ction, and of stories in general, since the
latter will consist of propositions whose constituents are just such intensional
objects (cf. [5]).
Before proceeding, however, there is an important distinction regarding the
notion of a logical form that needs to be made when joining conceptualism and
realism in this way. This is that logical forms can be perspicuous in either of
two senses, one stronger than the other. The rst is the usual sense that applies
to all theories of logical form, conceptualist or otherwise; namely, that logical
forms are perspicuous in the way they specify the truth conditions of assertions
in terms of the recursive operations of logical syntax. In this sense, fully applied
logical forms are said to be semantic structures in their own right. In the second
and stronger sense, logical forms may be perspicuous not only in the way they
specify the truth conditions of an assertion, but in the way they specify the
cognitive structure of that assertion as well. To be perspicuous in this sense, a
logical form must provide an appropriate representation of both the referential
and the predicable concepts that underlie an assertion.
Our basic hypothesis in this regard will be that every basic assertion is the
result of applying just one referential concept and one predicable concept, and
that such an applied predicable concept is always fully intensionalized (in a
sense to be explained). This will place certain constraints on the conditions
for when a complex predicate expression is perspicuous in the stronger sense
such as that a referential expression can occur in such a predicate expression
only in its nominalized form. (A similar constraint will also apply to a dening
or restricting relative clause of a referential expression.) In the cases where a
relational predicable concept is applied, the assumption that there is still but
one referential concept involved leads to the notion of a conjunctive referential
concept, a notion that requires the introduction in intensional logic of special
quantiers that bind more than one individual variable. Except for briey noting
the need for their development, we shall not deal with conjunctive quantiers
in this essay.
2 A Conceptual Analysis of Predication
The form of conceptualism that I shall assume here is a holistic conceptualism
in which impredicative concept formation is possible. This holistic conceptual-
ism is not opposed to, but is rather based upon, a related form of constructive
conceptualism. The latter, as I have explained in [2] and [6], has a¢ nities with
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nominalism, with which it is sometimes confused, because both validate only
a predicative logic with a restricted form of comprehension principle. Holistic
conceptualism has similar a¢ nities with logical realism, with which it in turn
is sometimes confused, because both validate an impredicative comprehension
principle. Both the a¢ nities and the di¤erences between constructive conceptu-
alism and nominalism, and between holistic conceptualism and logical realism,
have already been described in [2]. These matters will not concern us here.
Nor will we be concerned with the di¤erence between constructive and holis-
tic conceptualism, which is of fundamental importance to the problem of how
mathematical knowledge is possible (especially knowledge based on the concept
of a limit or converging sequence of natural numbers). It is also important to
issues regarding the stages of conceptual and linguistic development between
pre-adolescence and post-adolescence (or the development of what Jean Piaget
calls formal operational thought), but we shall ignore developmental issues here
and assume that we are dealing with a mature or adult understanding of lan-
guage in which impredicative concept formation is possible (such as the concept
of a limit). The latter, as I have already noted in [2] and [6], is based not only
on the stages of concept formation described in constructive conceptualism, but
also on the capacity humans have for language. That is, impredicative concept
formation is a mediated process, and language and the linguistic ability to use
predicate expressions (as described in constructive conceptualism) is the means
used to master and direct such a process.
Concepts in the sense intended here, accordingly, are neither predicate ex-
pressions nor independently real properties and relations, and among predicable
concepts, some are impredicative in the sense that they involve or presuppose
a totality to which they belong. Predicable concepts in particular, as already
indicated, are cognitive capacities, or cognitive structures otherwise based upon
such capacities, to characterize and relate objects in various ways. This means
that they are not mental images or ideas in the sense of particular mental oc-
currences; nor are they individuals or saturated objects of any kind. Adopting
Gottlob Freges terminology, we shall speak of all concepts (of whatever kind)
as being unsaturated, though di¤erent kinds of concepts, e.g., referential and
predicable concepts, will be unsaturated in di¤erent but complementary ways.
Now as cognitive structures, concepts in the sense intended here are not
Fregean concepts (which are independently real functions from objects to truth
values in the case of rst-level concepts, or from rst-level concepts to truth
values in the case of second-level concepts), even though they may be modeled
by the latter to some extent. In particular, unlike Fregean concepts, the satu-
ration (or exercise) of a concept in the sense intended here does not result in a
truth value, but in a mental act, and, if expressed overtly, a speech act as well.
In this regard, the unsaturatedness of a concept consists in its non-occurrent or
purely dispositional status as a cognitive capacity that need not be exercised at
any given time (or even ever, for that matter). Moreover, it is the exercise (or
saturation) of such a capacity (as a cognitive structure) that informs particular
mental acts with a predicable or referential nature. In addition, as intersubjec-
tively realizable cognitive abilities that may be exercised by di¤erent persons
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at the same time, as well as by the same person at di¤erent times, concepts
in the sense intended here are objective universals, even though they are not
independently real properties and relations.
The two basic kinds of concepts that we shall be concerned with in this
essay are referential concepts and predicable concepts. It is the exercise of a
predicable concept, we have said, that informs a mental act (and, if expressed
overtly, a speech act as well) with a predicable nature. Similarly, it is the
exercise of a referential concept that informs the same act with a referential
aspect. A categorical judgment, for example, is a mental act that consists in
the joint application of both kinds of concept; that is, it is a mental event that
is the result of the combination and mutual saturation of a referential concept
with a predicable concept. Referential concepts accordingly have a type of
structure that is complementary to that of predicable concepts in that each
can combine with the other in a kind of mental chemistry that results in a
mental act having both a referential aspect and a predicable nature. A general
thesis that we shall maintain here is that every assertion (qua speech act) that is
syntactically analyzable in terms of a noun phrase and a verb phrase (regardless
of the complexity of either) is also semantically analyzable in terms of an overt
application of a referential and a predicable concept, and that the assertion itself
is the result of their mutual saturation in that joint overt application.
It should perhaps also be noted that intensional objects of the kind that we
shall describe in this essay are in no sense to be understood as constituents of
an assertion or of a mental act; nor are they constituents of any events at all for
that matter. Rather, they are only logical projections on the level of individual
objects of the contents of our predicable and referential concepts, where by the
content of a concept we mean essentially the truth-conditions determined by
the di¤erent possible applications of that concept.
In describing how this logical projection comes about, it must be kept in
mind that predicable concepts are not independently real properties and rela-
tions, and, unlike referential concepts, their primary role in thought and com-
munication is not referential but predicative. Yet, through a development of
the interplay between language and thought, predicable concepts as cognitive
capacities can be transformed into secondary or derived abilities that enable
us to apply those concepts in a denotative manner corresponding to the use
in natural language of nominalized predicates as abstract singular terms. It is
through just such a secondary or derived application of a predicable concept,
i.e., through a form of conceptual nominalization, that we project the existence
of an intensional object, because what we purport to denote by such an appli-
cation is a property or relation in the sense of an independently real platonic
form. Thus, not only might we predicate of a building that it is rectangular,
or of a person that he is wise by applying a predicable concept in each case,
but, in addition, we also purport to denote the properties of rectangularity and
wisdom, respectively, by applying those same concepts denotatively.
Purporting to denote and actually denoting are not the same thing, however,
and despite all of our purportings there may in fact be no independently real
properties and relations that are actually denoted by nominalized predicates.
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What I have called the Abelardian thesis in [2], [3] and [6] is in fact the claim that
though di¤erent things may fall under the same concept, and in that sense have
something in common, nevertheless a denotative application of that concept will
always fail to denote anything at all.
As philosophical theories go, the Abelardian thesis may in fact be true. But
it is not consonant with the view that is expressed in natural language and our
common-sense framework in which most, if not all, of our purportings regarding
the denotata of nominalized predicates are taken at face value; and it is that
view that is our primary concern here. Thus, opposed to the Abelardian the-
sis as a conceptualist view is the alternative conceptualist view of conceptual
realism, which in no way should be confused with logical realism. The prob-
lem of how we learn our native language if all knowledge must ultimately be
grounded in psychological states and processes is not a problem but a project
in conceptualism. And when intensional objects are acknowledged as real, ab-
stract individuals, their role in the theory is always as concept-correlates; that
is, our knowledge of such objects is only indirect and through the process of
nominalization.
2.1 Concept-Correlates and Freges Double Correlation
Thesis
Intensional objects, I maintain, are concept-correlates; that is, they are real, ab-
stract individuals that are somehow correlated with predicable concepts. Some
intensional objects are also correlated with referential concepts; but that is be-
cause every referential concept uniquely determines some predicable concept,
and it is as the correlate of such a predicable concept that an intensional object
is also, indirectly, the correlate of a referential concept. It is these intensional
objects that will be our primary concern in our discussion of referential concepts,
and that we will identify as the real objects of the propositions toward which we
might stand in various cognitive attitudes. Before taking up our discussion of
these objects, however, we shall briey review what I have said elsewhere about
concept-correlates in general.
Let us note rst that the important thing about concept-correlates is that our
knowledge of them is only indirect and through the process of nominalization.
This is because a semantical account of the role of a predicates nominalization
as an abstract singular term always presupposes a semantical account of the
role of that same predicate as a predicate. This means in particular that any
relational predicate such as exempliesor falls under, as in Socrates exem-
plies humanityand Bucephalus falls under the concept horse, is to be viewed
as derived from an account of predication in which predicates do not have such
nominalized forms, as in Socrates is humanand Bucephalus is a horse. The
latter sentences are conceptually prior to the former, in other words, as is clear
from the psycholinguistic evidence on initial language acquisition. Indeed, for
the conceptualist the priority of the role of a predicate as a predicate over the
corresponding role of its nominalization as an abstract singular term is in fact
one of the ways that we are to understand Freges famous context principle. For
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it is only in the context of a sentence that a predicate can occur as a predicate,
and it is primarily through a correlation with such occurences that we are to
understand the role of a nominalized predicate as an abstract singular term.
Frege himself was not a conceptualist, or at least not in the sense intended
here. Yet predicable concepts can be modeled, as we have indicated, by Freges
rst-level concepts, and referential concepts can be similarly modeled by his
second-level concepts. Note that the latter do not correspond to predicates the
way that rst-level concepts do, but to variable-binding operators that apply
to w¤s (well-formed formulas) and that result in w¤s when so applied (such as
the existential quantier when a¢ xed to an individual variable). (Equivalently,
second-level concepts correspond to w¤s with free predicate variables that can
be used in a third-level comprehension principle to specify a variable-binding
operator, such as the w¤ (8x)[F (x) ! G(x)] for the second-level relation of
subordination of one rst-level concept to another.) Second-level concepts, in
other words, are represented by variable-binding operators (or sentential con-
texts) in the scope of which a predicate occurs as a predicate. The rst-level
concept represented by such a predicate is then said by Frege to fall within
the second-level concept represented by the operator in a sense similar to, but
also di¤erent from, that in which an object is said by Frege to fall under that
rst-level concept.
Now the notion of a concept-correlate really has its origin in Frege, since
all concepts for Frege were unsaturated functions (having truth values as their
values) and therefore could not themselves be objects. In addition, as I have
explained in [2], [3] and [4], the connection for Frege between a concept and its
correlate is also based upon the priority of the semantical role of a predicate
over that of its nominalization as an abstract singular term. This connection
was expressed by Frege in what I have called his double-correlation thesis, that
is to say, the thesis that corresponding to each second-level concept there is a
special rst-level concept such that a rst-level concept, say, G, falls within that
second-level concept if, and only if, the object correlated with G (i.e., the object
denoted by the concept G) falls under the corresponding rst-level concept.
Or in symbols (in the monadic case), where subject position occurrences of a
predicate variable are nominalized occurrences of that variable:
(8Q)(9F )(8G)[(Qx)G(x)$ F (G)]:
Thus, for example, corresponding to the second-level concept of (objectual) ex-
istence, i.e., the second-level concept that existential quantier phrases binding
individual variables stand for, there is the special rst-level concept of being
realized ; and, according to Frege, the correspondence is so tight that even the
same proposition is expressed by, e.g., there is a square root of 4 and the
concept square root of 4 is realized(cf. [9], pp. 49f). A concept-correlate is
realized, in other words, if, and only if, there exists an object that falls under
the concept in question.
Concept-correlates for Frege, as I have explained in [3], are not what nom-
inalized predicates purport to denote, namely intensional objects, but are rather
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value-ranges (Wertverläufe), or classes (Begri¤sumfangen) in the case of monadic
predicates. This is because Frege was committed to an extensional logic in his
analysis of mathematics, and, apparently, in his analysis of thought as well (cf.
[10], p. 122). Conceptualism need not follow Frege in such a view, however,
and I shall not assume that it does so here. Nevertheless, there is something
important to conceptualism about Freges view of value-ranges or classes as
concept-correlates, namely that they are logical objectsthat have their being
not in the objects that belong to them but in the concepts whose extensions
they are. This corresponds in conceptualism to the idea that our knowledge of
intensional objects is only indirect and through the process of nominalization.
For intensional objects are logical objects par excellence, and in conceptual re-
alism we might well maintain that they are the only logical objects that there
are, and that though they are real abstract individuals, nevertheless, at least
in an epistemological sense, they have their being only in the concepts whose
correlates they are.
Freges double correlation thesis, in other words, as a thesis about the priority
of the semantic role of predicates as predicates over that of their nominaliza-
tions as abstract singular terms, provides an ideal explanation in conceptualism
of why our knowledge of intensional objects is only indirect and through the
process of nominalization. For just as the double correlation thesis provides an
explanation in Freges extensional framework of how by means of our logical
faculties we lay hold upon the extension of a concept, by starting out from
the concept([10], p. 181), so too in conceptualism, where the thesis is about
referential and predicable concepts and the intensional objects that are their cor-
relates, it provides an explanation of how by means of our conceptual abilities
we lay hold upon the intension of a concept, by starting out from the concept.
3 Russells Paradox in Conceptual Realism
Freges double-correlation thesis does more than provide an explanation in con-
ceptualism of the epistemically derivative status of intensional objects. It also
provides a solution to Russells paradox. The solution, it turns out, allows
for a reconstruction of Russells early (pre-1905) form of logicism, as well as
two alternative reconstructions of Freges form of logicism (cf. [3]). As might
be expected, given Freges distinction between concepts and concept-correlates
and the way that predicable and referential concepts can be modeled by Freges
rst-and second-level concepts, one of the reconstructions of Freges system can
be developed as an intensional logic for conceptual realism.
Now what is noteworthy about the logico-grammatical context of both Freges
and Russells early form of logicism is that it contains the essentials of what con-
stitutes a theory of logical form. These are (1) the basic forms of predication
that underlie any possible assertion we might make in language, (2) sentential
connectives for the formation of compound w¤s, (3) quantier expressions that
reach into predicate as well as subject positions (just as they do in natural lan-
guage), and last, but not least, (4) nominalized predicates (and propositional
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forms) as abstract singular terms. Frege and Russell did not interpret these
essentials in the same way, their most important di¤erence, as I have explained
in [3], being in what each took nominalized predicates to denote. In particular,
for Russell a nominalized predicate denoted as a singular term the same inde-
pendently real property or relation that the predicate otherwise expressed in
its role as a predicate. For Frege, as we know, the distinction between what a
predicate stands for and what its nominalization denotes as an abstract singular
term is fundamental, just as it is in conceptual realism except that for Frege
what a predicate stands for is not a cognitive capacity but an independently
real function from objects to truth values.
In describing the logical grammar that is in question here, we shall adopt the
traditional practice of marking the nominalization of a predicate by deleting the
argument or subject positions that come with it in its role as a predicate, i.e.,
by deleting the parentheses (and commas in the case of a relational predicate)
that precede and succeed (or separate in the case of commas) the singular terms
to which the predicate can be applied. Thus, for example, whereas F (x) and
R(x; y) are w¤s in which F and R occur as predicates, G(F ) and G(R) are w¤s
in which F and R occur as singular terms. In F (F ) and R(F;R), F and R occur
both as predicates and as singular terms (though no single occurrence can be
both as a predicate and as a singular term).
In addition to simple predicates, we also need a device for constructing com-
plex predicates. Instead of Freges smooth-breathing abstraction operator or
Russells circumex operator, we shall use Churchs -operator for this purpose.
Thus where ' is a w¤, we will also have [x']( ) and [x1:::xn']( ; :::; ) as
complex 1-place and n-place predicates (note the accompanying pair of paren-
theses and commas) and [x'] and [x1:::xn'] as complex singular terms (in
which the parentheses and commas that come with the predicates have been
deleted). For convenience, we shall usually drop the accompanying parentheses
and commas when referring to predicates (as we did in the preceding paragraph),
though always, whenever a predicate occurs in a w¤ as a predicate it will have
an accompanying pair of parentheses (and commas as well if it is a relational
predicate).
As individual variables, we shall use x, y, and z, with or without a
numerical subscript, and as n-place predicate variables we shall use Fn, Gn,
and Rn. (We will usually drop the superscript when the context makes clear
the degree of a predicate variable, or when it does not matter what degree it
is.) Propositional variables, it should be noted, are assumed here to be 0-place
predicate variables. Note that where n = 0, [x1:::xn'] is just ['], which we
shall abbreviate as ['] and read as that 'when it occurs as an abstract singular
term, i.e., as a nominalized propositional form. Finally, as logical constants,
we shall use ^, _, !, $, :, , , =, 8, 9 and  with their usual readings.
For convenience, we ignore going into the formal details of dening the di¤erent
types of meaningful expressions here (but refer the reader who wants such details
to [2], chapter V or [3], §7).
Our inclusion of the modal operators  and  for necessity and possibility
may seem to conict with Freges extensional view of logic, but actually, were
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we to assume Freges principle of extensionality, i.e., his basic law (Va),
(8x1):::(8xn)('$  )! [x1:::xn'] = [x1:::xn ]; (Ext)
what would follow in a reconstruction of his framework is only the redundancy
of  and  as formula operators. That is, ('$ ') and ('$ ') would then
be provable, in which case both operators could be read simply as it is the case
that. Of course we shall not assume (Ext) in our development of conceptual
realism; nor, for that matter, will we assume its intensional counterpart,
(8x1):::(8xn)('$  )! [x1:::xn'] = [x1:::xn ]: (Ext)
(In general, we use a -label as a reminder that the theses we consider deal
with w¤s that contain nominalized predicates as abstract singular terms.) Our
inclusion of the modal operators here, in other words, is primarily so as to make
clear what is not being assumed in our development of conceptual realism. (The
modal operators have other uses in conceptual realism that we shall not go into
in the present essay.) For the purposes of conceptualism itself, incidentally, we
should also include the tense operators that are needed to represent the cog-
nitive schemata characterizing our conceptual orientation in time and that are
implicit in the form and content of our assertions as mental acts. These addi-
tions, however, along with others yet to be specied, will be left to our general
understanding of how the present grammatical framework is to be extended in
its application to conceptual realism.
Now in regard to Russells paradox, let us note that a fundamental assump-
tion of the logistic context in which this paradox was originally formulated is
the unrestricted comprehension principle,
(9Fn)([x1:::xn'] = F ) (CP)
where ' is a w¤ in which Fn does not have a free occurrence. No paradox is
forthcoming, it should be noted, if no nominalized predicate occurs in ' as an
abstract singular term, i.e., if ' is a w¤ of standard second-order predicate logic.
Russells paradox, in particular, requires the use of a nominalized predicate in
the following instance of (CP):
(9F )([x(9G)(x = G ^ :G(x))] = F ):
One way to avoid Russells paradox, accordingly, at least from the point of
view of Russells and Freges logical realism, is to restrict (CP) so as to exclude
certain w¤s ' in which nominalized predicates occur. This would leave intact
all of standard second-order predicate logic, and in that regard most of the
predicates of natural language that we want to represent. The restriction would
be justied in the context of Russells and Freges logical realism in that what
(CP) posits in such a context are independently real properties and relations,
and what Russells paradox shows is that we must put some constraints on how
we posit such entities. The problem, however, is how to decide in a principled
way which w¤s are to be excluded from (CP) and which are not. Excluding
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all w¤s that contain nominalized predicates would do, but that would lead to a
rather impoverished version of logical realism that no longer has the naturalness
or the power of the original framework. And excluding w¤s only in an ad hoc
manner, i.e., once it is discovered that they lead to a contradiction, would
result in a non-e¤ective comprehension principle, i.e., one for which it cannot
be e¤ectively decided what is and what is not an instance of that principle.
What is needed, in other words, is an e¤ective rule by which to decide which
w¤s are to be excluded and which not, and one, moreover, that leaves the bulk of
the original framework essentially intact. For the purpose of conceptual realism,
as opposed to Russells and Freges logical realism, it would also be appropriate
if such a rule had a natural explanation in conceptualist terms, i.e., in terms
that were directly based on the conceptual process of nominalization.
Now Freges double correlation thesis, as I have explained in [3], provides
the basis for just such a rule. Thus, in the context of Freges form of logi-
cism, the idea is that if, in accordance with the thesis, second-level concepts can
be correlated with rst-level concepts, then third-level concepts, i.e., concepts
within which second-level concepts fall, can be similarly correlated with second-
level concepts, and therefore by the product of these correlations, third-level
concepts can be correlated with rst-level concepts. Similarly, fourth-level con-
cepts can be correlated with third-level concepts and therefore with rst-level
concepts as well. In general, in other words, all concepts of whatever level can
be correlated with, and in e¤ect be represented by, rst-level concepts and the
concept-correlates that fall under them.
But if all higher-level concepts can be correlated in a telescoping manner
with rst-level concepts, then a natural constraint on the conditions for specify-
ing a rst-level concept under which concept-correlates fall, i.e., for restricting
instances of (CP) in which the comprehending w¤ contains occurrences of
nominalized predicates, is that these conditions are to be stratied in a way
corresponding to the stratication of the di¤erent levels of concepts that are be-
ing telescoped and represented in that rst-level concept. That is, the e¤ective
rule for restricting the comprehension principle (CP) is that it should apply
only to w¤s whose component predications can be stratied. More precisely,
for reasons explained in [2] and [3], the -abstracts that are to be allowed in in-
stances of (CP) must all be homogeneously stratied (cf. [2], p. 217, [4], §4 or
[3], § 9 for the denition of homogeneous stratication). Accordingly, since we
are assuming that every (n-place) predicate expression stands for a predicable
concept, i.e., for a value of the bound (n-place) predicate variables, this means
that any -abstract that is not homogeneously stratied must be excluded as
not being grammatically well-formed. The resulting logic, which is obtained
by simply extending the laws of standard second-order predicate logic so as to
apply to w¤s with, as well as w¤s without, nominalized predicates as abstract
singular terms, is easily seen to be equiconsistent with the theory of homoge-
neous simple types; and for that reason it is called, HST, or HST* when it
is extended to include the axioms and rules of the S5 modal propositional logic
as well.
HST is not itself a type theory, it should be emphasized, but is a second-
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order predicate logic with nominalized predicates as abstract singular terms, i.e.,
with nominalized predicates as legitimate substituends of the bound individual
variables. In this regard, HST retains all of the natural features of the
framework that Frege and Russell originally had in common in their respective
versions of logicism at the turn of the century; and, except for the exclusion
of inhomogeneously stratied -abstracts, it seems to retain all of the power
of expression of that framework as well. Of course, as the basis for a logical
reconstruction of either Freges or Russells early form of logicism, certain axioms
will still need to be added to HST, such as (Ext) for Freges system and
perhaps (Ext) for Russells, along with a certain principle of rigidity (for
Russells no-classestheory) that reduces classes to those properties that have
the same extension in every possible world. These are not matters that concern
us here, however (but see [3] for details). For besides being the basis of a logical
reconstruction of either Freges or Russells early form of logicism, HST is
also the basis for the development of an intensional logic for conceptual realism,
and it is this development that is our concern in this essay.
First, let us note that from the point of view of conceptual realism, the
collapsing and telescoping of Freges hierarchy of concepts into the level of rst-
level concepts and their concept-correlates explains why in fact we do not have
expressions in natural language for anything like Freges third- and higher-level
concepts, i.e., why the only concepts we normally construct corresponding to
those of Freges hierarchy are the predicable and referential concepts we exercise
in thought and speech. For it is not that natural language expressions for so-
called higher-level concepts cannot in principle be constructed, such as, e.g.,
third-level quantiers binding variables for referential (quantier) expressions.
Rather, even aside from their complexity and inelegance, such expressions are
completely superuous. That is, we do not need such expressions because we
can already say by means of the expressions that we construct for predicable
and referential concepts, and the intensional objects that are their concept-
correlates, all that we could ever say with the so-called third- and higher-level
concepts that they would stand for. And that we can do this is what Freges
double correlation thesis enables us to explain in conceptual realism.
It is not the case, however, that HST gives the best way of expressing
Freges double correlation thesis in the context of conceptual realism. For unlike
the situation in Freges and Russells versions of logical realism, what predicates
stand for in conceptual realism are concepts in the sense of cognitive capacities
and not independently real properties and relations (or functions from objects
to truth values). In that regard, the exclusion of inhomogeneously stratied
-abstracts from the class of grammatically well-formed predicate expressions
seems inappropriate and counter-intuitive. After all, how could Russell even
have formulated his paradox if we could not form a concept, to begin with,
corresponding to the predicate [x(9G)(x = G ^ :G(x))]? It is one thing to
maintain that certain predicates, when nominalized, have no independently real
property or relation corresponding to them, but quite another to claim that
we cannot form the concepts that these predicates otherwise stand for in their
role as predicates. As a description of the laws of compositionality for concept-
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formation, in other words, as opposed to the laws for positing independently
real properties and relations, we should allow no restrictions to be imposed on
the comprehension principle (CP). But then how, in the context of conceptual
realism, are we to avoid Russells paradox?
The answer is implicit in what we have just said regarding the di¤erence
between the laws of compositionality for concept-formation and the laws for
positing independently real properties and relations; namely, that whereas the
one set of laws pertains to the role of predicates as predicates, the other pertains
to the role of their nominalizations as abstract singular terms. The solution,
in other words, is that we cannot impose on reality the demand that to what-
ever concept we can form there must always be an independently real property
or relation that is that concepts correlate. Some concepts are such that they
allow for no logical projection on the individual level of their intensional con-
tent, i.e., of the truth conditions that are determined by their di¤erent possible
applications.
Logically, what this solution comes to is allowing that some singular terms,
and certain nominalized predicates in particular, must be denotationless. That
is, we must adopt a logic that is free of existential presuppositions regard-
ing singular terms.1 Leaving (CP) and the laws of second-order predicate
logic otherwise intact, i.e., otherwise than replacing its rst-order component
by one that is free of existential presuppositions for singular terms, note that
although (CP) posits the existence of a concept that we can form corre-
sponding to [x(9G)(x = G ^ :G(x))] as a predicate, nevertheless, by Rus-
sells argument, it is provable that there can be no object corresponding to
[x(9G)(x = G ^ :G(x))] as a singular term. No paradox is forthcoming, in
other words; rather, what follows is only that the Russellian concept in question
has no object corresponding to it as a concept-correlate.
The problem now, however, is how do we know that any nominalized predi-
cates denote at all. Indeed, in the logical framework as described so far, even the
Abelardian thesis mentioned earlier that no nominalized predicate at all denotes
can be consistently maintained. That thesis, however, as already noted, is not
consonant with our use of nominalized predicates in natural language and leads
us away from and not towards the development of conceptual realism. What
is needed instead is a principled way of positing the existence of intensional
objects as the correlates of most, even if not of all, of our concepts.
The obvious solution is to turn once again to Freges double correlation the-
sis. For just as that thesis provides a way of consistently positing properties and
relations in the system HST, so too it can be used to posit the same prop-
erties and relations in the new system that is free of existential presuppositions
regarding singular terms. That is, on the basis of Freges double correlation
thesis we can assume that at least all of the concepts that have correlates in
HST also have correlates in the new system. This assumption is formally
described in [2], [3] and [4] in terms of a certain axiom scheme (9/HSCP), and
1See [1] for a general discussion of logic free of existential presuppositions for singular
terms.
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the result of adding this scheme to the new system in question results in the in-
tensional logic I have called HST (because of its close similarity to HST).
(As noted in [4], HST and HST are equiconsistent, and, as a result, it is
easily seen that HST and HST are too.) It is the system HST that we
propose taking as the basis for our development of conceptual realism.2
4 What Are the Natural Numbers and Where
Do They Come From?
The question of the ontological status of the natural numbers and of our epis-
temological grasp of them provides a useful introduction to the kind of analysis
we intend here between referential concepts and the intensional objects that
are their correlates. For there are three ontological aspects in which the nat-
ural numbers have in general been described by philosophers, and each of them,
it turns out, corresponds to one or another of the three types of expressions
involved in our conceptual realist version of Freges double-correlation thesis.
The rst type of expression is that of numerical quantier phrases. The
entities associated with these expressions are usually called quantities e.g.,
ve chairs, two cats, ten people, one president, etc. Their basic use, according
to conceptualism, is as referential expressions, and what they stand for as such
are referential concepts. The quantities that are usually associated with these
expressions, according to the conceptual realism we want to defend here, are
really the intensional objects that are the correlates of the referential concepts
they stand for in their basic use. That is to say that quantities, on our proposal,
are the intensions of certain referential concepts; namely, those expressed by
numerical quantier phrases.
Now some numerical quantier phrases do not refer to any particular kind
of object, but to objects in general; and for that reason we shall call them pure
numerical quantier phrases. The ones that we are interested in here can be
contextually dened as follows:
(0x)'x = df:(9x)'x;
(1x)'x = df (9x)('x ^ (0y)[y 6= x ^ '(y=x)]);
(2x)'x = df (9x)('x ^ (1y)[y 6= x ^ '(y=x)]);
etc:
Under the ontological aspect of quantities, the natural numbers, according to
conceptual realism, are none other than the pure quantities that are the concept-
correlates of the referential concepts expressed by pure numerical quantier
phrases.
2Another option is available here as well, it should be noted; namely, the system T

described in [2], chapter V. This system is motivated by a di¤erent way of extending the
ramied logic for constructive conceptualism described in [6] into a logic for holistic conceptual
realism.
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The second type of expression is that of the cardinal number predicates
e.g., has twelve instances, or even has twelve members. The entities associ-
ated with these predicates are usually called cardinal number properties. Thus,
to take one of Freges examples, the class of Apostles has twelve members, or
equivalently, the property of being an Apostle has twelve instances. In Bertrand
Russells no-classesversion of logicism, the natural numbers were in e¤ect iden-
tied with the nite cardinal number properties. Of course, in conceptualism
predicates stand for concepts and not for properties; but then in conceptual re-
alism the properties in question are just the intensional objects denoted by the
nominalized forms of those predicates as abstract singular terms. The predicates
themselves can be dened in terms of the corresponding quantier phrases as
follows. (We retain the parentheses here so as to emphasize that we are dening
predicates in these cases and not abstract singular terms.)
0( ) = df [F (0x)F (x)]( );
1( ) = df [F (1x)F (x)]( );
2( ) = df [F (2x)F (x)]( );
etc:
(A -abstract of the form [F'] is an abbreviation for a -abstract of the form
[x(9F )(x = F ^ ')]). Note, incidentally, that these denitions indicate the
general way in which a predicable (rst-level) concept is to be correlated with a
referential (second-level) concept in accordance with Freges double correlation
thesis. Also, in accordance with conceptual realisms version of Freges thesis,
note that the cardinal number properties that are the intensions or concept-
correlates of the predicable concepts that the above predicates stand for are
none other than the pure quantities already identied as the natural numbers.
In other words, the natural numbers under either of these ontological aspects
come to the same thing, as far as conceptual realism is concerned.
Finally, the third and last type of expression for the natural numbers are the
numerals as abstract singular terms. These are the expressions most favored in
mathematics since the entities associated with them are the natural numbers in
their most simple or direct ontological aspect. But their simplicity of expression
is misleading and leads to the epistemological problem of how the natural num-
bers are conceptually accessible to us. This problem, along with the problem of
how intensional objects are in general conceptually accessible to us, is resolved
in conceptual realism through its version of Freges double correlation thesis.
For all abstract singular terms, including numerals, according to conceptual re-
alism, are ultimately explained on the basis of a nominalizing transformation of
predicates. Thus, the numerals in particular can be dened as follows:
0 = df [F (0x)F (x)];
1 = df [F (1x)F (x)];
2 = df [F (2x)F (x)];
etc:
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Note that on this analysis the natural numbers are epistemically accessible to
us in just the same way that concept-correlates in general are namely, through
the concepts whose correlates they are. That is, we are conceptually able to
think about the natural numbers because we are conceptually able to lay hold
upon them as the intensions of the (predicable concepts determined by the)
referential concepts that pure numerical quantier phrases stand for. And this
conceptual ability, we have said, is just what in conceptual realism is explained
by Freges double-correlation thesis.
Finally, that the natural numbers denoted by numerals as abstract singular
terms turn out to be just the pure quantities that are the intensions of the
referential concepts expressed by pure numerical quantiers is a natural, and not
a fortuitous, result. For it explains why children rst learn about quantities, e.g.
two apples, four cows, ten trees, etc., and only later, after they have formed the
concept of an object simpliciter, learn about the numbers themselves. That is,
children learn to think about the natural numbers as abstract objects by learning
rst to objectify the content of the referential concepts expressed by numerical
quantier phrases, and then, by means of the concept of an object simpliciter,
they learn to think about the natural numbers as the objectied contents of
the referential concepts expressed by pure numerical quantier phrases. And
that this is possible is just what is explained in conceptual realism by Freges
double-correlation thesis.
5 Referential Concepts and Quantier Phrases
Referential concepts can be expressed not only by numerical quantier phrases,
but by quantier phrases in general. Moreover, just as the referential concepts
expressed by pure numerical quantier phrases are constructed on the basis of
those expressed by numerical quantiers and the concept of an object simpliciter,
so too referential concepts that refer to objects in general are constructed in a
similar way on the basis of those that refer to objects of a given sort.
Now by a sort, or sortal concept, we here mean a type of concept whose use
in thought and communication is associated with certain identity criteria, i.e.,
criteria by which we are able to distinguish and count objects of the sort in
question. Sortal concepts are expressed in natural language not by predicates,
it should be noted, but by common nouns, or what we shall call common names.
Not every common name stands for a sort in the sense intended here, how-
ever. In particular, the common names thing, individual, and object(which
we assume to be synonymous) do not stand for a sortal concept, because the
concept of a thing, individual or object simpliciter is not associated in its use
with any particular identity criteria. Rather, according to conceptualism, the
concept of a thing, individual or object simpliciter is constructed on the basis
of the concept of an object of a sort (cf. [13]). Reference to objects of a given
sort is accordingly not a restricted form of reference to objects in general. This
is not to say that the two forms of reference do not lead to logically equivalent
forms of assertions, the way, for instance, an assertion of all men are mortal
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is logically equivalent to one of every object is such that if it is a man, then it
is mortal. Being logically equivalent, however, only means that the two forms
of assertion have the same truth conditions, and not that they represent the
same cognitive act of assertion as well; for whereas the referential concept used
in the one assertion is that expressed by all men, the referential concept used
in the other is that expressed by every object. This means that if we want
our theory of logical form to be perspicuous not only in the way it species the
truth conditions of our assertions, but also in the way it species their cognitive
structure as well, then we need to add to our logical grammar a new syntactic
category of common names, and redene rst-order quantier phrases as being
of the form (8xS), (8yT ), (9zS), (9xT ), etc., in which S and T are common
names. Thus, for example, where S stands for the sort raven and F stands for
the predicable concept of being black, a categorical judgment that all ravens are
black or that some ravens are not black can be represented by the logical forms
(8xS)F (x) and (9xS)[x:F (x)](x), respectively. (We use [x:F (x)] to stand
for the concept of not-being-black, which is being predicated of some ravens. We
distinguish in this way negations that are internal from those that are external
to a predication.)
Now although the concept of an object simpliciter is constructed on the basis
of the concept of an object of some sort or other, this does not mean that the
construction is by means of an explicit denition. That is, where S is a sortal
common name variable, we do not adopt the following as denitions:
(8xObject)'x = df (8S)(8xS)'x;
(9xObject)'x = df (9S)(9xS)'x:
This kind of construction may in fact be all that there is to the concept of an ob-
ject (thing, or individual) simpliciter, but we want to leave open the possibility
that at some stage of conceptual development we are able to refer to objects for
which no identity criteria can even in principle be constructed. For this reason,
we will not assume that all common names either stand for sortal concepts or
are denable, in one way or another, in terms of those that do. However, instead
of using (8xObject)or (9xObject)in representing references to all, or some,
objects simpliciter, we will continue to use the standard quantier phrases (8x)
and (9x)for this purpose.
Finally, let us also be note that not all common names are simple; that is,
some are complex and involve the use of a deningrelative clause that further
species the kind of object that is being referred to. Thus, for example, the
sentence Every citizen (who is) over twenty-one is eligible to votecontains the
complex common name citizen (who is) over twenty-one. We shall use the
notation, (8xS='x)and (9xS='x)to represent references based upon such
complex common names. For instance, (8xCitizen=x is-over-21)can be used
to represent a reference to all citizens (who are) over twenty-one.
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6 Singular Reference
The combination of a quantier phrase with a predicate expression is one ex-
ample of the linguistic rule that divides a sentence into a nominal(referring)
expression and a verbal (predicating) expression. More than that, however,
it also illustrates in a perspicuous way what we mean by the complementar-
ity of referential and predicable concepts; namely, that it is their combination
and mutual saturation in particular acts of thought, including speech acts, that
accounts for the referential and predicable aspects of those acts. It is natural,
accordingly, that we should seek a similar explanation when the noun phrase
is either a denite description or a proper name; that is, when the reference is
purportedly singular.
I have in fact already given such an explanation in [7] and [8], which I shall
only briey describe here. The general idea is that when a denite description
or proper name is used as a referential noun phrase, i.e., to express the result of
applying a referential concept, then its proper representation in logical syntax
is not as a singular term but as a quantier expression. In addition, since the
referential use of a denite description or proper name may be with or without
existential presupposition, then there really are two sorts of referential concepts
that might be involved in such a use, namely, one in which the singular reference
is with, and the other without, existential presupposition.
Now a quantier representation of the distinction between the referential use
of a proper name that is with, as opposed to without, existential presupposi-
tion is already at hand in the distinction between the universal and existential
quantier signs. Thus, for example, an assertion that Pegasus can y in which
the purported reference to Pegasus is with existential presupposition can be
perspicuously represented by
(9xPegasus)[xFly(x)](x);
whereas an assertion of the same form but in which the reference is without
existential presupposition can be represented by
(8xPegasus)[xFly(x)](x):
There is an obvious similarity here in the logical roles we are assigning to
proper names and common names, and in fact, as I have proposed in [7] and [8],
proper names can be assimilated with sortal common names. For just as the
referential concept underlying the use of a sortal common name is associated
with certain identity criteria, so, too, the referential concept underlying the
use of a proper name brings with it certain identity criteria; namely, those
provided (in a given context) by the most specic sortal concept associated
with that names introduction into discourse (as determined by the context of
use in question). Of course, proper names are di¤erent from common names in
that they are used (in a given context) to refer to at most one object, which
is why we say that the referential concept underlying their use has singular
reference. Proper names can, on occasion, be used to refer to more than one
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object; but unlike the unambiguous use of a common name to refer to a number
of objects, a proper name can be used in this way only ambiguously.3
Unlike the situation with proper names, a quantier representation of the
distinction between the referential use of a denite description that is with, as
opposed to without, existential presupposition requires the introduction of two
new quantier signs, such as, e.g. 91, and 81. Thus, where S is a common name
and F and G are monadic predicates, an assertion of the form,
The S that is F is G;
in which the denite description is being used with existential presupposition
will be represented by
(91xS=F (x))G(x);
and an assertion of the same form but in which the denite description is being
used without existential presupposition will be represented by
(81xS=F (x))G(x):
In both cases, it should be noted, the denite description is not being represented
in our logical syntax as a singular term (i.e., as an expression that can be
meaningfully substituted for an individual variable). In this regard our analysis
is similar to Russells, even though the results are quite di¤erent.
Now the di¤erence between our analysis and Russells is noteworthy here
because of the light it sheds on the two ways in which logical forms can be
perspicuous. For a slight reformulation of Russells contextual analysis shows
that the two analyses are formally equivalent and therefore describe the same
truth conditions. That is, the biconditionals,
(91xS=F (x))G(x)$ (9xS)[(8yS)(F (y)$ y = x) ^G(x)];
and
(81xS=F (x))G(x)$ (8xS)[(8yS)(F (y)$ y = x)! G(x)];
in which the right-hand sides represent Russells contextual analysis,4 are to be
taken as valid in our intensional logic for conceptual realism. Regardless of this
formal equivalence, however, it would be inappropriate in conceptualism to rep-
resent the structure of an assertion of the form in question i.e., its structure as
a speech act by either of the w¤s that correspond to Russells analysis. This
is because the logical forms determined by Russells analysis specify only the
truth conditions for an assertion of the form The S that is F is G, and not
also its cognitive structure. In particular, although Russells analysis provides
a perspicuous representation of the truth conditions for such an assertion, it
3Proper names can also be used to construct identically appearing common names, as, for
example, when we say of someone wise that he is a Solomon, or of someone who has betrayed
his friend that he is a Judas.
4Russell did not himself distinguish between the use of a denite description with, as op-
posed to without, existential presupposition. We correct for that omission in our reformulation
of his contextual analysis.
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does not also provide a perspicuous representation of the referential and pred-
icable concepts that make up the cognitive structure of that assertion. Thus,
regardless of whether the referential concept that is being applied in such an as-
sertion is with or without existential presupposition, it is in either case the same
predicable concept that is being applied. In the w¤s corresponding to Russells
analysis, however, it is not the same but a di¤erent predicable concept that is
being applied in each case, as can be seen by using -abstracts to stand for the
predicable concepts in question. That is, on Russells analysis, the assertion is
described as having one of the following forms,
(9xS)[x((8yS)(F (y)$ y = x) ^G(x))](x);
and
(8xS)[x((8yS)(F (y)$ y = x)! G(x))](x);
in which it is clear that the predicable concept that informs the assertion with a
predicable nature is di¤erent in each case. Note also that whereas the assertion
in question is the result of jointly applying a complex referential concept with
a simple predicable concept, what is represented by the w¤s corresponding to
Russells analysis is, at best, an assertion that is the result of jointly applying
a simple referential concept with a complex predicable concept.
Finally, if taken literally, there appear to be two referential concepts (as
represented by quantier phrases) involved in the one assertion in either case of
Russells analysis, whereas of course there is really just one referential concept
that is being applied in any assertion of the form in question.5 This means that
in a proper analysis of the structure of an assertion as an overtly expressed act
of thought, no quantier expression should occur as such, i.e., as standing for
a referential concept, other than the initial quantier expression that stands
for the one referential concept that is being applied in that act. Our general
thesis will be that an applied predicable concept is never constructed on the
basis of a referential concept, applied or otherwise, but only on the basis of the
intensional content of such a referential concept, i.e., only on the basis of the
concept-correlate of that referential concept.
7 The Intensions of Referential Concepts as Com-
ponents of Applied Predicable Concepts
As already indicated, we take the intension of a referential concept to be the
concept-correlate of the predicable concept determined by that referential con-
cept. In general, accordingly, where S is a proper or common name (complex
or simple, and including the ultimate superordinate common name Objector
Individual), and Q is a quantier symbol (representing a determiner of natural
language), we may dene the predicate expression, and thereby the abstract
5 In the above formulations the second quantier phrase in each occurs with the complex
predicate, i.e., within the -abstract.
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singular term that is its nominalized form, that is determined by the quantier
phrase (QxS) as follows:
[QxS] =df [F (QxS)F (x)]:
Thus the quantities that we mentioned earlier, namely ve chairs, two cats,
ten people and one president, are just the intensional objects [5xChair], [2xCat],
[10xPerson] and [1xPresident] corresponding to the numerical quantier phrases
(5xChair), (2xCat), (10xPerson), and (1xPresident). (Pluralizing a
common name is a morphosyntactic feature of surface grammar that has no
counterpart in our present intensional logic.) The quantities corresponding to
pure numerical quantiers are of course just the natural numbers. Thus, for in-
stance, by our convention for deleting the common name Object, [3xObject] =
[3x], which by our earlier denition is just the number 3 itself.
Now aside from the natural numbers and the impurequantities, the inten-
sional objects of referential concepts in general have a fundamental role to play
in the conceptualist theory of predication we have briey outlined in section
one. In particular, as indicated at the end of the last section, we shall assume
that in any context in which a predicable concept is applied so as to inform
a mental or speech act with a predicable nature, it is only a fully intensional
predicable concept, i.e., a concept whose construction is based on the intensions
of referential concepts instead of on those referential concepts themselves, that
is actually applied. Formally, this means that an applied predicable concept is
represented only by a predicate expression in which no referential (quantier)
expression occurs other than as part of an abstract singular term (such as a
nominalized w¤, in which case the referential role of that expression has been
deactivated and replaced in e¤ect by its intensional content).
Consider, for example, a context in which the following argument is asserted.
John nds a unicorn;
therefore, there is a unicorn such that John nds it.
In this context, Johnis being used as a referential expression in the premise,
but not in the conclusion; and, similarly, whereas a unicornis being used ref-
erentially in the conclusion, it is not being used referentially in the premise. As-
suming that Johnis being used in this context with existential presupposition,
these di¤erences can be represented as follows (where it is not the referential
concept of the premise or conclusion, respectively, that is a component of the
predicable concept of the conclusion or premise but its intensional content):
(9xJohn)[xFinds(x; [9yUnicorn])](x);
therefore; (9yUnicorn)[yFinds([9xJohn]; y)](y):
An activated referential concept is never part of what informs a mental or
speech act with a predicable nature, in other words, but only functions as what
informs that act with a referential nature. This means that an applied pred-
icable concept is never formed on the basis of a referential concept, but only
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on the basis of the intensional content of such a referential concept, i.e., only
on the basis of the concept-correlate of that referential concept. Of course,
corresponding to every predicate expression, there will always be a fully inten-
sionalized predicate expression that is its intensionalized counterpart; namely,
the predicate expression that is formed in the exact same way, except for having
a nominalized quantier phrase as a component in its analysis wherever that
quantier phrase occurs in the original predicate expression. Indeed, it is for
this reason that we can say that every predicable concept can in principle be
applied in this theory; for to apply a predicable concept in this theory means in
part to intensionalize it, i.e., transform its expression into its fully intensional
counterpart, and then to apply that result. In other words, just as reference is
fundamentally an intentional act in which we purport to refer to an object or
objects of a certain kind, regardless of whether there really are objects of that
kind or not, so predication, in our account, is an intensional act in which only
a fully intensionalized predicable concept is applied. As we observe below, this
explains why, in particular, we can say that John seeks a unicorn, without it
following that there is a unicorn that John is seeking. It will also explain how
di¤erent people can have cognitive attitudes toward the same purported object,
even though no such object actually exists.
Before turning to these accounts, however, let us note that not only must
a predicate expression that represents the predicable concept of an assertion
be fully intensionalized, but so must the quantier phrase that represents the
referential concept of that act, which means that the deningrelative clause, if
any, of that quantier phrase must also be similarly intensionalized. That is, no
referential (quantier) expression is to occur in any w¤ representing the dening
relative clause of a referential expression that stands for an applied referential
concept, unless that expression occurs as part of an abstract singular term
(where its referential role has been deactivated and replaced by its intensional
content). Thus, for example, in an assertion of the form,
Every man who owns a donkey feeds it,
we have a complex referential concept being applied that is expressed by the
quantier phrase, Every man who owns a donkey; and in this referential ex-
pression the dening relative clause, who owns a donkey, contains the simple
quantier phrase, a donkey. No reference is being made in this assertion to a
donkey, but only to every man who owns a donkey; that is, the referential role
of the quantier phrase a donkeyhas been deactivated in this assertion and
replaced by its intensional content. Accordingly, assuming that the pronoun it
is being used as an anaphoric substitute for the quantier phrase any donkey
that he owns, the proper logical representation of this assertion can be given
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as follows:6
(8xMan=Owns(x; [9yDonkey]))(xFeeds(x; [8yDonkey=Owns(x; y)])](x):
8 Intensional Versus Extensional Predicable Con-
cepts
One of the puzzles that our theory of the intensionalization of applied predicable
concepts is designed to explain is how one argument of the same logical form as
another can be valid, while the other is invalid. The following two arguments,
for example,
John nds a unicorn;
therefore, there is a unicorn such that John nds it.
John seeks a unicorn;
therefore, there is a unicorn such that John seeks it.
clearly have the same logical form; and yet whereas the rst is intuitively valid,
the second is just as intuitively invalid. But, of course, arguments of the same
logical form must either both be valid or both be invalid.
The usual way taken to resolve this sort of puzzle is to resort to paraphrase
e.g., to maintain that seeksshould to be paraphrased as tries to nd and
then to claim on the basis of such a paraphrase that the arguments are not
really of the same logical form after all.7 Our explanation is more simple and
turns on the obvious fact that whereas ndsstands for a relational predicable
concept that is extensional for objects in its range as well as for objects in its
6Note that although the following simpler w¤,
(8xMan)(8yDonkey)(Owns(x; y)! Feeds(x; y));
has the same truth conditions as the w¤ in our analysis (because of the extensionality of
Feeds), it cannot, for reasons already explained, be taken as a perspicuous representation of
the structure of the assertion as a speech act. Nor for that matter can
(8xMan)[xFeeds(x; [8yDonkey=Owns(x; y)])](x);
which at least represents the act in terms of only one referential concept, albeit the wrong
one. It is not the simple referential concept expressed by every man that is being applied
in this assertion, but the complex referential concept expressed by every man who owns a
donkey.
7Compare Richard Montagues On the Nature of Certain Philosophical Entities, in [12].
Montague renounced this approach in his later papers, Universal Grammarand The Proper
Treatment of Quantication in Ordinary English, also reprinted in [12]. In fact, the theory
we describe here, while it di¤ers from Montagues later theory in a number of ways, never-
theless has much in common with his later theory. Indeed, our whole program of conceptual
realism may be seen as a new way to approach Montague Grammar, including in particular
replacing Montagues logical realist intensional logic with its sense-denotation distinction by
a conceptual realist version of second-order predicate logic with nominalized predicates as
abstract singular terms.
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domain, seeks stands for a relational predicable concept that is extensional
only for the objects in its domain. Formally, the fact that ndsstands for a
relational predicable concept that is extensional in its range can be expressed
by the following meaning postulate schema (where Q is a schematic quantier
sign representing the determiners of natural language):
[xFinds(x; [QyS])] = [x(QyS)Finds(x; y)]:
In particular, as an instance of this schema we have,
[xFinds(x; [9yUnicorn])] = [x(9yUnicorn)Finds(x; y)];
which, together with -conversion and the meaning postulate expressing the
fact that the same relational concept is extensional in its domain as well, shows
that the rst of the above two arguments is indeed valid after all. Such a
justication cannot also be given for the second argument, on the other hand,
since the relational concept that seeks stands for is not extensional for the
objects in its range. Thus the important point about where the two arguments
di¤er is not in their form, but in the kind of relational concept each is based
upon, i.e., whether or not the relational concept in question is extensional for
the objects in its range as well as for the objects in its domain.8
It should be noted that an instance of the above meaning postulate schema
identies only the concept-correlates of the predicable concepts that the -
abstracts stand for (in their role as predicates), and not also those predicable
concepts themselves. Of course, strictly speaking it is meaningless to speak
of identity as a relation between concepts as unsaturated cognitive capacities,
because identity is a relation only between objects. But even granting some
indirect sense in which concepts might be said to be identical (such as might
be given by the principle of intensionality, (Ext), described in section 3), it
would still be inappropriate to speak of the concepts in the above instance of
the given meaning postulate as being identical; for the concepts di¤erin that
where one has a referential concept as a component of its analysis, the other
8Strictly speaking, meaning postulates are analytic truths, and therefore, like logical truths,
they are not merely suppressed premises of an argument, but function as part of the analytic
background within which all argumentation is given.
We should perhaps note in this context that the so-called de re interpretation of John
seeks a unicorn has nothing to do with the relational concept that seeks stands for, but
rather is based instead on the use of ellipsis. That is, the sentence in question in that case is
really John seeks a certain unicorn, which, by ellipsis, can be transformed into John seeks a
unicorn. The argument, John seeks a certain unicorn; therefore there is a unicorn such that
John seeks it, is indeed valid; but this is because of the following meaning postulate for the
quantier phrase a certain S(symbolized here by (9cyS)):
[xSeeks(x; [9cyS])] = [x(9yS)Seeks(x; y)]:
This postulate is analytically true not because of the relational concept that seeks stands
for, but rather because it is an instance of the following meaning postulate schema:
[x1:::xnR(x1; :::; xn; [9cyS])] = [x1:::xn(9yS)R(x1; ::; xn; y)]:
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has the concept-correlate of that referential concept instead. Again, the point
of the identity is not that the predicable concepts are the same, but rather that
they have the same intensional content, i.e., the same concept-correlate.
Note that even if the concepts themselves are not the same, the fact that
they have the same intension (concept-correlate) means that they have the same
extension, i.e., whatever falls under the one concept falls under the other. Falling
under the one concept, however, means standing in a certain conceptual relation
to an intensional object, whereas falling under the other means standing in the
same relation to a concrete object. Nothing follows, of course, to the e¤ect
that an intensional object is a concrete object; but still, because this situation
is typical of most, if not all, relational concepts, we should be cautious in not
drawing that conclusion in other cases as well. One type of context in which
this caution is particularly important, for example, is where an identication is
made by means of the relational concept that the copula isstands for, as when
isis used with a common name, a proper name, or a denite description. An
assertion of the form John is a teacher, for example, will have the following
logical form,
(9xJohn)[x Is(x; [9yTeacher])](x);
as a perspicuous representation of its cognitive structure. This is because the
predicate expression that is applied in this assertion must, on our theory, be
intensionalized, which means that, compositionally, the predicable concept ex-
pressed is analyzed (or formed) in terms of the intensional content (concept-
correlate) of the referential concept that the quantier phrase a teacherstands
for, and not in terms of that referential concept itself. But note that nothing
follows here to the e¤ect that John, a concrete object, is identical with the in-
tensional object in question. This is because the relational concept that the
copula is stands for is not quite the same thing as the relation of identity.
The connection between the two is given by the following meaning postulate
(schema):
[x Is(x; [QyS])] = [x(QyS)(x = y)]:
Thus, from the assertion that John is a teacher it does follow (by Leibnizs
law and -conversion) that John and some teacher are identical, which can be
represented as follows:
(9xJohn)(9yTeacher)(x = y):
Note that although this last w¤ correctly describes the truth conditions for
an assertion of the form that John and some teacher are identical, it cannot
also, in our theory, represent the structure of that assertion as a speech act. For
in our theory such an assertion must be the result of applying one referential
concept together with one predicable concept, and what would be needed for
that purpose in this case is a way of representing the conjunctive referential
concept that the quantier phrase John and some teacherstands for. Thus,
for example, where (9xS ^ 9yT ) is a quantier expression binding two vari-
ables, each associated with a di¤erent proper or common name, the cognitive
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structure of an assertion of the form John and some teacher are identicalcan
be perspicuously represented as follows:
(9xJohn ^ 9yTeacher)[xy(x = y)](x; y):
The same observations apply to uses of is as a copula in identication
with respect to a proper name or denite description. Thus, for example, a
perspicuous representation of the cognitive structure of an assertion of the form
John is the thiefcan be given as follows,
(9xJohn)[x Is(x; [91yThief ])](x);
which, even though it has the same truth conditions, is to be distinguished from
a perspicuous representation of an assertion of the form John and the thief
are identical. Similarly, a perspicuous representation of an assertion of the
morning star is the evening starcan be given as follows,
(91xMorningStar)[x Is(x; [91yEveningStar])](x)
which is to be distinguished from a perspicuous representation of the morning
star and the evening star are identical, even though assertions of either sentence
will have the same truth conditions.9
9 The Intentional Identity of Intensional Ob-
jects
The use of the copula in classication, as in x is a teacher, has a predicable
counterpart that, aside from its di¤erence in conceptual or logical role, comes
close to being synonymous with the common name used in that classication.
Corresponding to the common name teacher, for example, we also have the
predicate [x Is(x; [9yTeacher])], which when nominalized, can be read as to
be a teacher. In general, in other words, every common name S has a predicable
counterpart [xIs(x; [9yS])], which in turn can be nominalized and read as to
be an S, or, equivalently, as being an S, which, appositionally, can also be
read as the property of being an S.
Closely related to the predicable counterpart of a common name S there is
another predicate that, when nominalized, is also read as to be an S, namely
9Note that a conjunctive quantier phrase such as the morning star and the evening star
can be broken up (e.g., by a rule of transformational grammar) so that from the morning star
and the evening star are identicalwe can derive the morning star is identical with the evening
star. The point is that if in asserting the latter sentence we mean to refer to both the morning
star and the evening star, and assert that they are identical, then in doing so we are really
applying a single conjunctive referential concept rather than two non-conjunctive referential
concepts. (If we mean to refer only to the morning star, however, then, properly speaking, we
should use the copula alone, instead of the phrase is identical with.) Every basic assertion,
in other words, consists of the application of but one referential concept and one predicable
concept, and where the latter is a relation, this only means that the referential concept is
conjunctive, and not that there are multiple referential concepts being applied together.
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[x(x = [9yS])]. Despite their common reading in natural language, however,
these predicates are in no sense equivalent, and, for our purposes, we shall
distinguish them here by reading the latter instead as to be an intensional S.
Thus, in addition to a classicatory common name concept S and its predicable
counterpart of being an S, we also have the predicable concept of being an
intensional S. This latter notion, like that of being an S, also turns out to
be the predicable counterpart of a common name concept, except that in this
case the common name concept is constructed on the basis of the predicable
concept, rather than the predicable concept being constructed on the basis of the
common name concept. In addition, despite the di¤erence in content between
the new common-name concept and the original, the two are expressed in natural
language by the same common name. That is, the same common name is used
in natural language sometimes to express the one concept and sometimes the
other, just as the same predicate expression is used in natural language to stand
for either of their predicable counterparts. For our purposes, we shall distinguish
the two by distinguishing between the original common name S and a derived
common name S that is contextually dened as follows (where Q is a schematic
quantier sign):
(QxS)' =df (Qx=x = [9yS])':
An important claim that we shall make here is that it is the ambiguity in
natural language between being an S and being an intensional S, i.e., between
being an S and being an S, which is the source of our various puzzles about
intentional identity. This means that in resolving these puzzles we must distin-
guish not only between a de re and a de dicto attitude toward an S, in which the
latter really amounts to a de dicto attitude toward an S, but also, and more
importantly, between a de re attitude toward an S and a de re attitude toward
an S. Our puzzles about intentional identity arise, it turns out, because we
use the same expression in natural language to describe the one kind of de re
attitude as to describe the other.
The best known of the puzzles about intentional identity has been given by
Peter. Geach, who observes that we have intentional identity when a number
of people, or one person on di¤erent occasions, have attitudes with a common
focus, whether or not there actually is something at that focus([11], p. 147).
For example, a reporter in Gotham village, describing what he takes to be an
outbreak of witch mania and not of actual witchery, asserts the following:
Hob thinks a witch has blighted Bobs mare, and
Nob wonders whether she (the same witch) killed Cobs sow.
The problem here, as Geach observes, is to explain how a pronoun in one
indirect-speech clause is on the face of it bound to a quantier phrase in another
such context (ibid., p. 150); that is, to explain how the pronoun she(with
its parenthetical phrase the same witch) that occurs in the second part of the
reporters assertion is bound by the quantier phrase a witchthat occurs in
the rst part of his assertion. We shall refer to this problem in its general form
as the problem of intentional identity.
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Now the simplest explanation of how the pronoun she is bound to the
quantitier phrase a witch is that the reporter intends to refer in the second
part of his assertion to a witch, and in particular to the same witch that he refers
to in the rst part of his assertion; and therefore that he is really describing the
de re attitudes that Hob and Nob have toward the same witch. Formally, this
interpretation can be described as follows, where x has blighted Bobs mareis
symbolized by F (x), and x killed Cobs sowis symbolized by G(x).
(9xWitch)[x(Thinks([9yHob]; [F (x)])^Wonders-Whether([9zNob]; [G(x)]))](x):
Note that in this logical form there is but one referential expression occurring
as such, namely (9xWitch), and, similarly, one predicate expression occurring
as such, namely the -abstract that is specied in terms of a conjunction. We
assume that the reporters use of Hoband Nobis with, and not without, ex-
istential presupposition, which means that their proper symbolic counterparts
are of the form (9yHob)and (9zNob), respectively. But because in this ver-
sion of the de re interpretation Hoband Nobare not being used referentially
but as part of a fully intensionalized predicate, then (9yHob)and (9zNob)
must be replaced by their intensional correlates, i.e., by their nominalized forms
[9zHob]and [9zNob], respectively.Finally, in regard to the abstract singular
terms [F (x)] and [G(x)], it should be kept in mind that by our earlier notational
conventions, these expressions are really nominalizations of the w¤s F (x) and
G(x), respectively.
One of the problems with the above analysis is that it construes the reporters
conjunction of two assertions as a basic assertion with a conjunctive predicate.
That is, instead of exercising one referential concept with one predicable concept,
the reporter is really exercising two referential concepts, each with a di¤erent
predicable concept. In addition, the one referential concept that the above
analysis describes the reporter as applying commits him to the existence of a
real witch, when in fact he means to commit himself only to an intensional witch
that is the common focusof Hobs and Nobs cognitive attitudes. (This fact is
not determined by the surface form of his assertion, but by the context in which
it is made, namely that he is reporting only on what he takes to be witch mania
and not on actual witchery.)
Now both of these problems are resolved, even if not entirely satisfactorily, in
what is called the de dicto interpretation of the reporters compound assertion.
On this interpretation, the pronoun shethat occurs in the second part of his
assertion is really a pronoun of laziness, that is, it occurs there as an anaphoric
substitute for some other expression. The expression Geach himself considers is
the denite description, the witch who blighted Bobs mare. On this sugges-
tion, the common focus of Hobs and Nobs cognitive attitudes, as described in
our version of conceptual realism, is the intensional object that is the correlate
of the referential concept that the description the witch who blighted Bobs
mareotherwise stands for. That is, on this interpretation the description, and
therefore also the pronoun she that is its anaphoric substitute, is not being
used referentially in this context, but is meant only to specify the intensional
27
object that is part of the de dicto content of Nobs cognitive attitude. In this
way we explain how the reporter is committed not to a real witch, but only to
an intensional witch.
The other merit of the de dicto interpretation, we have said, is that it cor-
rectly interprets the reporter as making two assertions that he conjoins, and
hence that he is really using two referential concepts and not just one. In par-
ticular, the reporter is now interpreted as using the proper names Hoband
Nobreferentially, and apparently with, as opposed to without, existential pre-
supposition. The formal version of this interpretation can be given as follows:
(9yHob)[yThinks(y; [(9xWitch)F (x)])](y) ^
(9zNob)[zWonders-Whether(z; [(91xWitch=F (x))G(x)])](z):
Note that in this analysis, in which the predicates are fully intensionalized, the
quantier phrases (9xWitch)and (91xWitch=F (x))occur as part of nomi-
nalized w¤s, and therefore do not stand for referential concepts but for their
intensional correlates instead. (It should also be kept in mind that the quanti-
er phrase (91xWitch=F (x))is read in English as the denite description the
witch who blighted Bobs mare.)
The major defect with this way of identifying the intensional object that is
the common focus of Hobs and Nobs cognitive attitudes as described by the
reporter is that it species too much. Nob, for example, as far as the reporter is
concerned, may not have thought or said anything about Bobs mare, in which
case it is incorrect to interpret the reporter as asserting of Nob that he wonders
whether the witch who blighted Bobs mare killed Cobs sow. In other words,
by interpreting the pronoun shein this context as an anaphoric substitute for
some other expression, we may impute more content to the second part of the
reporters assertion than he may in fact intend.
There is another way of identifying the intensional object that is the com-
mon focus of Hobs and Nobs cognitive attitudes, however; and, as indicated
earlier, it is based not on the de re-de dicto distinction between an attitude
toward a real witch and an attitude toward an intensional witch, but on the
di¤erent distinction between a de re attitude toward a real witch and a de re
attitude toward an intensional witch. The reason why our puzzle about inten-
tional identity arises, we have said, is because we use the same common name
in natural language to refer to a real witch as to refer to an intensional witch.
Consider, for example, the following somewhat redundant and clearly less
stylistic reformulation of the reporters assertion.
Hob thinks a witch has blighted Bobs mare, and
she, the same witch that Hob thinks blighted Bobs mare,
is such that Nob wonders whether she killed Cobs sow.
Reformulated in this way, it is again clear that the reporter is making two
assertions which he has conjoined, and that in the rst part of his conjunctive
assertion he is referring only to Hob and that he is describing him as having
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a certain de dicto attitude toward an intensional witch. Prima facie, if we
ignore the contextual fact that the reporter is reporting only on what he takes
to be witch mania and not on actual witchery, we would also understand him
in the second part of his assertion as referring purportedly to the witch that
Hob thinks blighted Bobs mare; that is, prima facie we would understand the
reporter as giving a de re description of Nobs cognitive attitude regarding a
certain witch.10 Formally, this interpretation can be described as follows:
(9yHob)[yThinks(y; [(9xWitch)F (x)])](y) ^
(91xWitch=Thinks([9yHob]; [F (x)])[xWonders-Whether([9zNob]; [G(x)])](x):
What is natural about this interpretation of the reporters assertion is that
it makes clear to whom or what he is purportedly referring by his use of the
pronoun shein the second part of his assertion, that is, in his de re description
of Nobs cognitive attitude. For if we were to ask that question of him, the
natural response would be: the witch that Hob thinks blighted Bobs mare. What
is problematic about our interpretation of this answer as represented in the
above analysis, however, is that it commits the reporter to the existence of a
real witch, when the contextual fact that we chose to ignore is that he intends
to refer only to an intensional witch, that is, to a witch. But this problem
is easily corrected; for if we are given the contextual fact that the reporter is
reporting only on what he takes to be witch mania and not on actual witchery,
then the referential concept that the quantier phrase the witch that Hob thinks
blighted Bobs marestands for in this context is based not on (the concept of)
being a witch but on being a witch*, that is, on being an intensional witch. It is
because the same common name is ambiguous in English between being a witch
and being a witch, in other words, that we must sometimes rely on contextual
information to determine which of two alternative referential concepts is actually
being applied in a given context. This means in particular that the above
analysis of the reporters assertion is essentially correct, except for its use of
Witchinstead of Witch. That is, the correct interpretation of the reporters
assertion, both in its original form and as reformulated above, once we are given
the contextual fact that he does not mean to refer to a real witch, can be given
as follows:
(9yHob)[yThinks(y; [(9xWitch)F (x)])](y) ^
(91xWitch=Thinks([9yHob]; [F (x)]))[xWonders-Whether([9zNob]; [G(x)])](x):
The solution we propose here to Geachs puzzle, needless to say, can easily
be generalized and applied to a variety of related puzzles about intentional
10 It may be objected, we agree, that in his original assertion the reporter means to refer
not just to the witch that, Hob thinks, blighted Bobs mare, but to Nob as well. In that case,
a more appropriate reformulation of the reporters assertion would utilize the conjunctive
quantier phrase Nob and the witch that Hob thinks blighted Bobs mare, and the predicate
in question would then be relational and not monadic. For convenience, we ignore the details
of this interpretation here, since its formulation and analysis parallels what we have to say for
the formulation and analysis that is based on non-conjunctive referential concepts.
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identity. The general point is that for each common name concept S, whether
simple or complex, we need to distinguish a de re interpretation regarding a
real S from a de re interpretation regarding an intensional S. Which de re
interpretation is meant in a given context will in general be determined by the
context if it is not already determined by the surface form of the assertion in
question.11 The notion of an intensional S, of course, is based on the notion of an
intensional object that is the correlate of a referential concept involving S, and,
as already explained, our conceptual grasp of such objects is primarily through
a conceptualist version of Freges double correlation thesis and the conceptual
counterpart of the process of nominalization. We are conceptually able to lay
hold upon and refer to the intensions of our referential concepts, as well as of
our predicable concepts, in other words, by starting out from those concepts
themselves.
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